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RESUMEN
Síntesis  histórica  de  la  política  de 
importación de banano de la Unión Europea. 
Este artículo resume los principales eventos en 
el conflicto entre la Unión Europea, los países 
productores  de  banano  de  África,  el  Caribe  y 
el Pacífico, los productores latinoamericanos, y 
Estados Unidos, relacionados con la importación 
de banano en la Unión Europea. Se discute el 
debate histórico acerca de estas políticas entre las 
partes interesadas, debate que ha llegado a cono-
cerse  como  “la  guerra  del  banano”.    Describe 
eventos recientes relacionados con el proceso de 
transición de un mercado altamente protegido a 
un sistema de importación de tarifa única, el cual 
podría  suavizar  el  conflicto  pero  no  terminar 
con esta “guerra”.  El artículo está dividido en 
7 partes: 1) descripción de la política de impor-
tación de banano de la Unión Europea antes de 
implementar la Política Comunitaria; 2) descrip-
ción de la Política Comunitaria de Importación 
de Banano en 1993; 3) discusión de los eventos 
que se originaron después de la aprobación del 
régimen de importación de 1993; 4) descripción 
de la perspectiva de la Unión Europea sobre la 
llamada guerra del banano; 5) convenio entre los 
Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea; 6) algunos 
resultados de investigaciones relacionadas con el 
nuevo sistema de importación y 7) conclusión.
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this article is to summarize 
the  main  events  that  have  characterized  the 
conflict  among  the  European  Union,  African, 
Caribbean and Pacific producers, Latin American 
exporters,  and  the  United  States,  regarding 
banana imports into the EU. The article provides 
a discussion of the historical debate over these 
policies  by  stakeholders,  a  debate  which  has 
come to be known as “the banana war.”  This 
article also shows that current events regarding 
the  transition  from  a  highly  protected  banana 
market in the EU to a tariff-only import system, 
which  may  lessen  the  skirmishing,  but  will 
not entirely put an end to this “war.”  There is 
such  a  variety  of  divergent  concerns  at  play, 
as  the  debate  over  the  last  decade  has  shown, 
that  fulfilling  everybody’s  interests  will  prove 
impossible.  The  paper  is  divided  into  seven 
sections  as  follows:  1)  description  of  the  EU 
policy  structure  prior  to  the  establishment  of 
the Common Market Organization for Bananas; 
2)  description  of  the  1993  Common  Market 
Organization for Bananas; 3) discussion of the 
events  that  followed  the  1993  import  regime; 
4) description of the EU perspective on the so-
called banana war; 5) agreement between the EU 
and the US; 6) some research findings related to 
the new import system and 7) conclusion.
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INTRODUCTION
The economic importance of the European 
Union’s (EU’s) banana market is evident in the 
history of trade disputes that have enveloped it 
for years. There is such a diversity of concerns 
at play that satisfying everybody’s interests has 
been  a  nearly  impossible  task  not  only  for  the 
EU, but for the United States (US), Latin America 
exporters, banana producers in former European 
colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific 
(ACP), as well as the involvement of the World 
Trade  Organization  (WTO).  Even  among  the 
same interest groups there is often disagreement 
on  the  way  import  restrictions  on  this  market 
should  be  administered.  Consider,  for  example 
one of the most current cases, Latin American 
producers who stand to gain the most from an 
open market. While Costa Rica advocates for a 
gradual elimination of the current import tariff 
to avoid an immediate overflow of the European 
market  that  would  excessively  decrease  export 
prices,  its  neighbors  believe  that  immediate 
deregulation of Europe is the sensible course of 
action. 
The purpose of this article is to summarize 
the  main  events  that  have  characterized  the 
conflict  among  the  European  Union,  Latin 
American  countries,  African,  Caribbean  and 
Pacific nations and the United States regarding 
banana imports into the EU. The subject is of high 
importance given the new import system adopted 
by the EU in January of 2006. This new import 
regime  replaces  the  previous  import  system 
whereby the EU banana market was regulated 
by  a  complicated  combination  of  tariffs  and 
quotas  on  non-preferred  suppliers.  The  article 
is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the 
EU policy structure prior to the establishment of 
the Common Market Organization for Bananas 
(CMOB) in 1993. Section 2 describes the CMOB 
as it was originally conceived. Section 3 discuses 
the  various  trade  disputes  held  between  1993 
and 2002 related to the import regime brought 
by  the  CMOB.  Section  4  describes  the  most 
common justifications of the CMOB given by 
the EU. Finally, section 5 details the agreement 
reached between the EU and the US in 2002 and 
the transition to the tariff-only import regime 
that came into effect in January of 2006. Section 
6 concludes.
EU IMPORT POLICY PRIOR TO 1993
The EU is primarily a customs union and as 
such each member nation must abide by a common 
set of import and export policies. Prior to 1993 
however, bananas were exempt from the union.
The 1993 policy to bring bananas under 
a  unified  tariff  structure  essentially  lead  to  an 
amalgamation  of  the  variety  of  prior  banana 
import  policies  prevalent  in  member  countries, 
thus  in  order  to  understand  how  the  current 
regime exists, it is necessary to understand from 
whence it came. 
Prior  to  1993,  there  were  3  general 
agreements  that  ruled  the  European  banana 
market:  i)  a  common  external  tariff  of  20% 
applied to non-preferred suppliers; ii) the Lomé 
Convention,1  that  gave  preferential  treatment 
to  the  banana  imports  from  former  European 
colonies;  and,  iii)  the  Treaty  of  Rome2  that 
allowed France, Italy and the United Kingdom to 
protect their preferred suppliers. Additionally, a  1  The Lomé Convention actually refers to accords from 
4 different conventions of that name between the EU 
and  71  countries  from  Africa,  the  Caribbean,  and 
Pacific. The first accord was signed in February of 
1975. It gives to these countries trade preferences for 
a group of commodities. Protocol number 5 of the 
Convention deals with the banana trade. It states that 
no ACP country will be made worse off in terms of its 
access to traditional markets and its preferred states. 
Specifically,  this  protocol  allows  ACP  countries  to 
export duty free bananas to the EU.
2  The Banana Protocol of the Treaty of Rome (March 
1957)  allowed  the  then  European  Community  to 
concede  permits  to  its  member  states  to  restrict 
banana  imports  from  other  nations.  The  protocol 
states 2 requirements for such a restriction: i) the 
good  must  be  produced  in  the  other  nation  and; 
ii)  the  restriction  must  safeguard  any  quotas  the 
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special protocol of the Treaty of Rome permitted 
Germany  to  import  duty-free  bananas  from 
any  country  (IICA  1995).  In  addition  to  these 
stipulations, each country was allowed to define 
its  own  banana  import  policy.  This  explains 
the  wide  variety  of  import  regimes  among  the 
EU prior the definition of the Common Market 
Organization. 
From  the  various  policies  it  is  useful 
to  define  3  categories  of  importing  European 
nations  within  the  policies.  The  first  group 
includes the mostly closed markets that protected 
their traditional suppliers from the ACP region 
over non-preferred producers, mainly from Latin 
America (Table 1). This group comprises Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, France and the United Kingdom. 
These countries conferred preferential treatment 
to other favored nations and granted a minimum 
price  for  their  bananas.  Additionally,  they 
imposed a quota in order to limit imports from 
third countries (Borrell and Maw-Cheng 1992). 
The second group comprises those countries that 
applied a 20% common tariff on non-preferred 
suppliers  with  the  objective  of  protecting  the 
ACP countries. The third category is made up of 
Germany, Austria, Sweden and Finland (Austria, 
Finland  and  Sweden  were  not  part  of  the  EU 
at  this  time).  These  nations  advocated  for  free 
trade and gave boundless access to their market 
to all suppliers. For a summary of the prevalent 
national policies before 1993, see table 2. 
France constituted one of the most protective 
markets.  In  general,  France  reserved  around 
2/3  of  its  market  for  its  overseas  departments 
(Martinique  and  Guadeloupe)  and  much  of  the 
rest for French speaking African countries, mainly 
Cameroon,  Côte  d’Ivoir,  and  Madagascar  (IICA 
1995).  It  is  estimated  that  in  1985-1987,  about 
94%  of  the  French  market  was  reserved  for  its 
overseas territories and former colonies (Borrell 
et  al.  1992).  Imports  from  third  countries  were 
licensed  and  allowed  only  when  import  prices 
Table 1.   EU banana exporter categories prior to 1993.
Preferred suppliers Non-preferred suppliers
African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACPs) countries
EU overseas territories
Latin American producers 
and others
Non-traditional ACP
Belize (a) Crete Brazil Belize (b)
Cameroon (a) Guadeloupe Colombia Cameroon (b)
Cape Verde Martinique Costa Rica Dominican Republic
Dominica Madeira Ecuador Ghana
Grenada The Canary Islands Guatemala Ivory Coast (b)
Ivory Coast (a) Honduras Other ACP
Jamaica Mexico
Madagascar Nicaragua
Saint Lucia Panama
Saint Vincent Philippines
Somalia Others no identified
Suriname
Windward Islands
Sources: Borrell (1994); Patiño and Andrea (2000).
(a) Traditional quantities. (b) Above traditional preferred quantities.AGRONOMÍA COSTARRICENSE 114
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reached a minimum level. Latin American imports 
were  limited  to  an  annual  270  000  t  and  were 
additionally taxed with the 20% common tariff. 
The United Kingdom granted free access 
to  Commonwealth  producers  such  as  Jamaica, 
Dominica, Grenada, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, 
Suriname  and  Belize.  Imports  from  other 
countries  were  subject  to  a  licensing  system 
and  were  only  allowed  when  there  existed  a 
shortage in the favored supply. Additionally, the 
20% common import tariff was applied to these 
imports. After 1989, a licensed minimum level 
of 30000 t was established for Latin American 
producers. Borrell et al. (1992) estimated that 3 
quarters of the market was granted to preferred 
suppliers.
Italy  allowed  free  access  to  imports  from 
European Community territories and ACP countries, 
Somalia being its traditional supplier. A 270 000 t 
quota was established to limit imports from other 
nations in 1983. This regulation remained in place 
until the approval of the 1993 import regime.
Portugal and Spain restricted their banana 
imports to protect their own producers; Madeira 
in the case of Portugal and the Canary Islands in 
the case of Spain. Both markets were closed to 
Latin American bananas other than in exceptional 
circumstances. Greece also limited access to its 
Table 2.   Restriction on non-preferred suppliers prior the establishment of the Common Market Organization for Bananas.
Group 1 (Wanted to  protect former colonies)
Country Tariff Quota  Other restrictions 
France 20% 270 000 t
Mostly closed to third 
countries’ exports. 
United Kingdom 20% 30 000 t
Licensed and allowed only when there 
existed a shortage in the favored supply.
Italy None 270 000 t None
Portugal and Spain None None
Group 2 (Wanted to protect ACP countries under the Lomé Convention)
Country Tariff Quota  Other restrictions 
Denmark 20% None None
Ireland 20% None None
Netherlands
20% None None
Belgium 20% None None
Luxemburg 20% None None
Group 3 (Advocated for free trade)
Country Tariff Quota  Other restrictions 
Germany No None None
Austria (1) No None None
Finland (1) No None None
Sweden (1) No None None
(1)  Countries not part of the EU when the CMOB came into effect.CHACóN-CASCANTE AND CRESPI: The European Union banana import policy 115
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market in order to protect its domestic production 
setting a prohibitive import tax on bananas from 
other regions (Borrell et al. 1992). 
Denmark,  Ireland,  Netherlands,  Belgium 
and  Luxemburg  granted  free  market  privileges 
to the traditional ACP suppliers. Although these 
countries did not have overseas banana producing 
territories, the benefits they conceded to the ACP 
nations  were  those  regulated  under  the  Lomé 
Convention. 
The  consequences  of  the  EU  policy 
structure, compared to a situation with free access 
for  all  producers,  were  reductions  in  overall 
banana imports, lower world prices but increased 
prices for EU consumers and preferred producers. 
As  a  result,  preferential  exporters’  production 
increased, exacerbating the problems related to 
lower world prices in other regions, particularly 
Latin  America.  Further,  the  way  in  which  the 
EU import licenses were written generated rent 
seeking behavior on the part of banana importers 
(Borrell 1997).
Import  restrictions  have  been  calculated 
to cost European consumers $1.6 billion a year. 
To  put  this  number  in  perspective,  despite  the 
fact that one justification of the import program 
was foreign aid, only $300 million actually went 
back to ACP producers, the remainder going to 
government revenue or lost surplus. Additionally, 
it cost $100 million a year to other developing 
countries  due  to  the  lost  export  opportunities 
(Borrell 1997). 
The  cost  for  society  has  not  been 
calculated on a world scale. Clearly, however, the 
incentives encouraged less efficient producers to 
use resources in the production of bananas and 
reduced  production  more  efficient  regions  (It 
has been estimated that a t of bananas produced 
in Latin America cost on average $162, whereas 
the  production  cost  of  bananas  produced  in 
the  EU’s  preferred  nations  reached  $500  t-1 
(Cascavel  1998)).  Removing  the  pre-1993  EU 
policy structure would have led to welfare gains 
for the global economy (Borrell 1997).
THE COMMON MARKET 
ORgANIzATION FOR BANANAS
The  EU  Common  Market  Organization 
for  Bananas  represented  the  consolidation  of 
various efforts to regulate the market. The first 
attempt  was  in  the  mid  seventies,  when  the 
main Latin American exporters argued for the 
necessity of organizing the market in order to 
overcome overproduction and low world prices. 
Although  the  implementation  of  a  Common 
Market was seen as a reinforcement of a customs 
union doctrine (WTO 1997), its main goal was 
to balance opposing interests of diverse groups 
affected  by  the  hodgepodge  of  national-level 
import policies. With the implementation of the 
1993  Agreement,  free  intra-EU  movement  of 
bananas was allowed, and the EU took a position 
of  reaching  3  main  importer-nation  objectives 
(Patiño and Andrea 2000):
1.  To  assure  overseas  territories  would  get 
higher  prices  to  compensate  for  their 
higher production costs.
2.  To  fulfill  the  commitments  with  ACP 
countries  made  through  the  Lomé 
Convention. 
3.  To ensure consumers an adequate supply 
of high-quality bananas from third-party 
countries (Borrell 1997). 
Since  prior  to  1993,  Latin  American 
bananas  represented  99.36%  of  non-preferred 
production, all the rules directed at “third-party” 
nations  refer  essentially  to  Latin  American  or 
“dollar bananas” (Zúñiga 1993).3
3  Since a large portion of the Latin American banana 
exports  are  dominated  by  US-headquartered 
companies,  bananas  from  Latin  America  are  also 
called dollar bananas.AGRONOMÍA COSTARRICENSE 116
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During the Uruguay Round negotiations, 
Switzerland,  Japan,  Finland,  Korea  and  New 
Zealand offered to liberalize their banana markets. 
In opposition to these initiatives, the European 
Union decided not to include the banana trade 
in  its  negotiations.  This  position  was  evident 
with  the  ratification  of  the  1993  regulation, 
which further restricted the EU banana market. 
However, this new regime was not compatible 
with WTO’s “most favored nation” clause since 
it  conceded  trade  preferences  to  ACP  nations 
(IICA 1995).4
The 1993 Agreement defined a specific set 
of  importing  guidelines  for  overseas  territories 
and  for  how  ACP  and  non-preferred  suppliers 
would  be  allowed  to  export.  A  quota  for  each 
supplier category was set. Overseas territory and 
ACP  exports  were  duty  free  up  to  the  amount 
specified by the quota. An initial tariff of ECU 
100 t-1 was imposed on intra quota imports for 
third party suppliers (mainly Latin America). The 
regime also allowed free movement of bananas 
among the European Union.
To protect production in overseas territories 
and  ensure  producers  from  those  regions  a 
minimum income, exports up to a maximum of 
854 000 t were eligible for deficiency payments 
(These  payments  were  made  by  the  EU).  The 
payment was defined as the difference between 
the market price and a reference price determined 
by the EU. Exports over these quantities were not 
covered by the compensation system. To guarantee 
that all countries benefited, a maximum import 
amount  subject  to  compensation  was  assigned 
to each one. This maximum level was allocated 
based  on  the  historical  quantities  exported  by 
each country. However, the limits imposed were 
greater than the 1991 export amount (Table 3). 
Communitarian suppliers were also eligible for 
additional  compensatory  assistance.  Producers 
who  had  to  abandon  banana  production  were 
subject to an indemnity. To qualify, they had to 
either cease all production if their plantation is 
less than 5 ha or at least 50% if it was greater than 
8 ha (Zúñiga 1993). 
ACP countries were split into 2 groups: 
traditional  and  non-traditional  suppliers.  ACP 
traditional imports consisted of bananas exported 
by ACP countries in annual historic quantities. 
The  non-traditional  category  incorporated 
imports  from  traditional  ACP  suppliers  over 
the quantities habitually exported and imports 
from other ACP countries that did not produce 
bananas prior to 1993. Exports from this group 
4  Most favored nation guarantees WTO country members 
they will get the same commercial treatment from their 
Table 3.   Overseas territories’ production subject to price compensation.
Overseas territory
Maximum production subject 
to compensation
1991 production Excess (%)
Canary Islands 420 000 339 450 23.73
Guadeloupe 150 000 116 124 29.17
Martinique 219 000 181 069 20.94
Madeira 50 000 N.A N.A
Crete 15 000 N.A N.A
Total 854 000 636 643 24.00
Source: Patiño and Andrea (2000).
trade partners as any other nation (http://en.wikipedia.
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were treated as if they were from non-preferred 
suppliers and taxed at €750 t-1. Traditional ACP 
exporters  enjoyed  duty-free  access  up  to  857 
700  t  as  well  as  any  other  quantity  imported 
when  unfilled  quotas  occurred  from  the  non-
preferred suppliers. The quota was split among 
the countries according to the traditional amount 
exported for each (Table 4). 
This treatment of over-quota exports was 
the only modification traditional ACP exporters 
faced  relative  to  their  situation  prior  to  1993. 
Under  the  Lomé  Convention  Agreement, 
traditional  ACP  countries  were  not  restricted 
at all in their duty-free imports. However, with 
the exception of Cameroon, the quotas imposed 
on each country did not limit their exports. As 
shown in table 4, nearly all of the export levels 
of the ACP countries were below the maximum 
duty-free quantities allowed from 1994 to 2000. 
One  exception  was  Cameroon,  whose  banana 
exports were greater than the duty-free quota in 
1999 and 2000. 
For non-preferred exporters, the Common 
Market  Organization  introduced  an  aggregate 
tariff-quota of 2 million t with a €100 t-1 tariff 
(roughly  equivalent  to  a  20%  ad-valorem  tax). 
Over-quota imports were subject to a levy of €850 
t-1 (comparable to a 170% ad-valorem taxation, 
Zúñiga 1993). Further, the quota was subject to 
change depending on the projected market situation 
each  year  as  a  function  of  predicted  European 
consumption and preferred supplier’s production 
only. Changes in Latin American production were 
not considered and Latin America was the only 
region  whose  allocation  was  smaller  than  the 
quantities it exported to the EU prior 1993. Notice 
for example in table 5 that Latin America exported 
to  the  EU  on  average  more  than  2.7  million 
Table 4.   Duty free import quantity limits for ACP suppliers and export levels in the period 1994-2000 (3)
Country Duty free quota
Actual imports
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Cote d’Ivoire (2) 155 000 - - 13 684 122 045 114 664 141 924 140 916
Cameroon 155 000 148 921 113 121 109 978 170 734 191 925
Suriname(2) 38 000 27 861 33 438 22 227 24 162 17 853 28 467 28 064
Somalia (2) 60 000 - - 13 540 13 457 4 551 0 0
Jamaica (2) 105 000 75 595 82 832 66 858 67 999 55 588 41 428 30 973
Saint Lucia (2) 127 000 - - 79 877 52 602 56 861 53 579 47 692
Saint Vincent/ 
Grenadine
82 000 - -
Dominica (2) 71 000 - - 27 260 27 053 22 543 22 755 18 058
Belize (1) (2) 40 000 - 34 409 35 027 27 613 36 979 37 826
Cape Verde 4 800
Grenada 14 000 4 504 4 695 1 451 59 47 501 507
Madagascar 5 900 - - - -
Total 857 700 107 960 120 965 408 227 455 525 409 698 496 367 495 961
Source: CORBANA (1993) and United Nations Statistics.
(1) Only a portion of Belize’s exports enjoys preferential treatment in the EU.
(2) Exports estimated from banana imports reported by the EU.
(3) t (Tons)AGRONOMÍA COSTARRICENSE 118
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t year-1 during 1980-1999. The quota of 2 million 
t  represented  about  72%  of  the  annual  average 
exports by this region to the EU.
The new regime also created an import 
licensing system to distribute the non-preferred 
quota  among  importers.  The  allowance  was 
split into 3 categories of operators on the basis 
of  historical  quantities  imported.  Category  A 
comprised  traditional  banana  importers  from 
Latin  America  who  were  allowed  to  import 
66.5%  of  the  2  million  t  quota.  Category  B 
consisted of operators who traditionally imported 
bananas  from  preferred  suppliers.  They  were 
authorized to import 30% of the quota assigned 
to  Latin  American  producers.  A  category  C 
was  created  to  reserve  import  rights  for  new 
importers  established  in  1992.  These  received 
the last 3.5% of the import quota assigned to 
Latin American exporters. 
Transference of import licenses was allowed 
between  importers  in  the  same  category  and 
among importers of categories A and B. It was not 
permissible to transfer licenses from or to category 
C. However, the principles that ruled the license 
transference were different for each category and 
harmed Latin American operators. For instance, if 
an importer of category A sold its import license to 
a category-B operator, the seller lost its license for 
the next period. However, if the transaction was in 
the opposite direction, from category B to A, this 
rule did not hold and the B operator was able to 
make use of its license the next period.
CMOB RELATED EVENTS AFTER 1993
The European policy has been extremely 
controversial since its creation in 1993. It faced 
numerous  obstacles  with  most  of  the  involved 
parties in the market, leading in most cases, to 
modifications of the original policy. 
Although the Latin American countries, as 
a region, do not enjoy the same economic power 
as the European Union, they have been proactive 
with regard to modifications to the 1993 import 
system leading to 3 of the major adjustments. The 
United States, because of its economic interests 
in the region, also had an important role in the 
so-called banana war challenging the EU import 
regime several times.
Table 5.   Exports of main Latin American banana producers (1980-1999) (1).
Country Total exports Exports to the EU Share of imports to the EU Share into EU total imports
Colombia 10 719.1 4 290.4 40.03 15.5
Costa Rica 13 034.4 5 730.7 43.97 20.7
Ecuador 17 567.3 3 931.9 22.38 14.2
Guatemala 4 025.6 497.1 12.35 1.8
Honduras 9 953.9 2 162.9 21.73 7.8
Nicaragua 845.0 259.0 30.65 0.9
Mexico 778.0 0.0 0.00 0.0
Panama 7 766.8 4 701.2 60.53 17.0
Dominican Republic 70.6 8.5 12.04 0.0
Total Latin America 71 951.6 27 734.4 38.55 100.0
(1) 100 t.
Source: United Nations. Comisión Económica para América Latina y El Caribe. Tendencias y Perspectivas de las Exportaciones 
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For exposition purposes, adjustments to the 
banana import policy are split into 2 chronological 
periods. The first covers changes that occurred 
between 1993 and the 1999 WTO declaration that 
the European import system was illegal. During 
this period, the 1993 regime was only marginally 
modified. The second period covers changes after 
the WTO declaration in 1999 through 2001. The 
last WTO resolution urged the EU to modify its 
policy. In this sub-section, the failed attempts to 
define a new import policy to please everybody 
are presented. It also describes the background 
for the EU-US 2001 agreement.
The  first  adjustment  to  the  regime  was 
made  in  1994  when  Colombia,  Costa  Rica, 
Venezuela and Nicaragua reached an agreement 
with the EU in the context of the Uruguay Round 
Negotiations (GATT). On this occasion, the quota 
for Latin America was raised to 2.1 million t. 
Then in 1995, with the conclusion of the 
Uruguay  Round  negotiations,  at  the  request  of 
Costa  Rica,  Colombia,  Ecuador  and  Panama, 
the  quota  was  increased  to  2.2  million  t  and 
the  within-quota  tariff  was  reduced  from 
100  ECU  to  75  ECU  t-1.  Additionally,  these 
countries negotiated a fixed participation in the 
quota applied to the Latin American exporters. 
Costa  Rica  and  Colombia  obtained  the  greater 
portion with 23.4% and 21% of the global quota, 
respectively.  Nicaragua  got  3%  and  Venezuela 
2% of the allowance. The parties were allowed 
to  trade  the  import  rights  among  themselves. 
However, the agreement was canceled in 1998, 
when Germany and Belgium requested an inquiry 
by  the  Justice  Tribunal  of  the  EU.  The  quota 
allocation was considered illegal, since the export 
rights discriminated among exporters.
An  additional  modification  of  the  quota 
to Latin American exporters was introduced in 
1995. A temporary tariff quota of 353 000 t was 
added when Austria, Finland and Sweden joined 
the  European  Union.  Nonetheless,  the  increase 
in  quota  was  not  large  enough  to  match  the 
total  banana  import  levels  these  countries  had 
prior  to  their  entering  to  the  European  Union. 
As shown in table 6, total imports of this group 
during the period 1990-1994 were greater than 
the  additional  Latin  American  quota  approved. 
Indeed,  the  growth  tendency  shown  by  these 
countries’  imports  stopped  once  they  joined 
the  European  Union.  The  additional  allowance 
applied  until  1997,  when  the  third-countries’ 
quota was set back to 2 200 000 t. 
It is interesting that the EU banana regime 
not only caused difficulties between the EU and 
the affected parties, but also divided the Latin 
American block. As a consequence of the quota 
allocation agreement negotiated by some nations, 
the Latin American unit split into 2 groups. One 
composed those countries that accepted the new 
import regime: Costa Rica, Venezuela, Nicaragua 
and Colombia. The other comprised nations that 
advocated  for  an  alternative  system:  Ecuador, 
Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala and Panama. 
Table 6.   Austria, Finland and Sweden banana imports for the period 1990-2000 (1).
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Austria 144 154 150 146 144 111 96 94 88 102 93
Finland 70 73 86 96 169 66 58 60 58 64 62
Sweden 143 160 162 153 154 147 149 159 175 185 187
Total 357 387 398 395 466 324 303 313 321 351 341
Difference respect to the quota -4 -34 -45 -42 -113 29 50 40 32 2 12
(1) 100 t.
Source: FAO StatisticsAGRONOMÍA COSTARRICENSE 120
Agronomía Costarricense 30(2): 111-127. ISSN:0377-9424 / 2006
The  US  supported  the  latter  group 
claiming that its firms were harmed by the EU 
import  regime.  In  fact,  the  US-headquartered, 
multinational  firms  felt  more  threatened  when 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Venezuela 
negotiated their allocations. The US firms argued 
that their economic interest would be harmed if 
the national quotas were executed because most 
of  their  production  was  not  allocated  in  those 
countries. 
Because  of  this  discontent,  the  US 
government  started  an  investigation  process  to 
determine if the actions taken by those countries 
truly  harmed  the  US  firms’  interests.  The  US 
threatened to impose economic sanctions on the 
nations  that  accepted  the  import  regime  if  the 
harm to its companies were proved. As a result, 
Nicaragua and Venezuela resigned the agreement 
and did not execute the allocated quotas assigned 
to them. On the other hand, Colombia and Costa 
Rica ratified the agreement. 
The US government threatened Costa Rica 
and Colombia with the suspension of commercial 
benefits  these  countries  enjoy  as  part  of  the 
Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  (CBI)  (The  CBI  is 
a unilateral preferential treatment between the 
US  and  countries  from  the  Caribbean  Area. 
It  allows  duty-free  entrance  to  exports  to  the 
US and its territories). Finally, the US favored 
Costa  Rica  and  Colombia’s  position.  The  US 
government understood these countries acted in 
defense  of  their  interest,  considering  the  high 
dependence of these countries’ economies to the 
banana activity.
In  1997,  the  US,  Guatemala,  Honduras 
and  Mexico  requested  a  hearing  of  the  Dispute 
Settlement  Body  (DSB)  of  the  World  Trade 
Organizations  against  the  EU  (Ecuador  and 
Panama supported the action but did not take part 
since they were not WTO members at that time). 
This  group  argued  that  the  EU’s  import  policy 
harmed their interests and favored ACP suppliers. 
On  this  occasion,  the  WTO’s  resolution 
partially favored the EU. The DSB determined 
that, although based on the terms of the Lomé 
Convention,  the  EU  was  right  to  concede 
preferences to the ACP nations, some aspects of the 
new import system were found to be in opposition 
to  WTO  rules,  specifically,  the  Agreement  on 
Import and Licenses Procedures, and the General 
Agreement  on  Trade  and  Services.  The  WTO 
affirmed that the CMOB unfairly discriminated 
against some importing and marketing firms in 
Latin  America.  As  a  result,  the  EU  adopted  a 
modified set of import policies that entered into 
force in January 1999. Three principal changes 
were introduced:
a)  The  4  “substantial  suppliers”  of  the  EU 
(Ecuador,  Costa  Rica,  Colombia  and 
Panama) were allocated specific shares of 
tariff-quotas A and B on the basis of the 
1994-1996 period.
b)  The  country-specific,  sub-quotas  within 
the  quota  for  countries  of  Africa,  the 
Caribbean and the Pacific were abolished. 
c)  The  complex  system  of  import  license 
allocation was simplified by reducing the 
number of market operator types from 7 to 
2 (traditional and newcomer operators).
These adjustments came in the context of 
a greater liberalization of the EU’s agricultural 
sector  and  its  commitment  to  the  WTO.  The 
adapted import system safeguarded the obligation 
the EU had with the traditional ACP suppliers 
and, at the same time, it met the responsibilities 
the EU had acquired with the WTO.
In 1999, Ecuador and the US confronted 
the European policy again and brought another 
demand to the WTO. These countries were not 
pleased with the modifications enforced in 1999 
by the EU. This time, the case was resolved in 
favor  of  Ecuador  and  the  US.  The  resolution 
imposed  an  important  precedent  in  the  WTO 
since it was the first time a developing country 
was authorized to execute economic sanctions on 
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to  impose  economic  sanction  on  the  EU.5 
Additionally, the EU was asked to make further 
changes to its banana import regime in order to 
make it compatible with WTO specifications. 
After  the  WTO  declared  the  European 
banana  import  system  illegal  in  2000,  the 
European  Union  Commission  started  a 
consultation  process  with  the  involved  parties. 
Its goal was to define a new WTO compatible 
policy generally accepted by the parties. By the 
end of 1999, the Commission proposed a “tariff 
only” system that would be introduced in 2006. 
Meanwhile, it suggested adopting a transitional 
tariff  quota  system  with  preferential  access 
for  ACP  producers.  The  proposal  suggested 
maintaining  type  A  and  B  quotas  during  the 
transition period, namely, maintaining the EU’s 
2.2 million t charged with a €75 t-1 tariff. The 
type-B quota would be autonomous and for an 
amount of 353 000 t for which the €75 t-1 tariff 
would also apply. Additionally, the EU considered 
the creation of a new autonomous quota (type C) 
of  850  000  t.  ACP  exports  would  continue  to 
enter duty free under any quota category. 
None  of  the  parties  expressed  any  kind 
of  disagreement  with  this  component  of  the 
proposal.  The  conflict  with  the  parties  started 
when the Commission communicated its intention 
of conceding import licenses on a historical basis. 
A new period of consultation started. 
After  7  months  of  discussion,  the 
Commission  announced  a  new  import  license 
distribution  system.  It  was  based  on  its  initial 
proposal  of  license  concessions  based  on  a 
historical  reference  period  but  also  considered 
a proposal made by the Caribbean countries and 
redefined the operators that would have access to 
the quotas. 
The  proposal  was  not  accepted  by  the 
US  operators  nor  by  some  Latin  American 
producers.  The  US  held  its  opposition  even 
though  the  Commission  estimated  that  US 
operators would fall into the new definition and 
therefore would increase their market share. A 
new dialogue process started with the objective 
of  reaching  an  agreement  about  the  historical 
reference  period  for  the  license  allocation. 
Once  again,  the  process  did  not  yield  any 
agreement between the parties (Commission of 
the European Communities 2000).
At  this  point,  the  Commission  initiated 
an  evaluation  of  a  quota  system  based  on 
a  “first  come,  first  served”  system.  It  was 
considered the last option to define an import 
policy  compatible  with  the  WTO  rules  and 
that  would  please  the  involved  parties.  The 
EU  recognized  many  advantages  in  the  “first 
come, first served” system. First, it was a WTO 
compatible import structure. In fact, the WTO 
defined it as a good system for the management 
of tariff quotas in its resolution of the Ecuador 
panel  in  1999.  Specifically,  it  represented  the 
solution to the quota management problem for 
it would imply the elimination of national quota 
allocations  and  definition  of  operators.  The 
distinction  between  traditional  and  newcomer 
operators would disappear. In addition, the rent 
shifting originated by the trade in license would 
be  overcome  (Commission  of  the  European 
Communities 2000).
However,  there  were  some  weaknesses 
attached to the system that required an adequate 
solution by the EU. For example, the perishable 
character of bananas requires the period between 
transportation from the production center and the 
arrival of the fruit to be limited. The proposed 
system could delay the process. There was also 
the  possibility  of  technical  difficulties  in  the 
ports  because  increased  shipments  may  create 
congestion. Additionally, there were also budgetary 
implications for the EU. Under a “first come, first 
served” system, the banana supply would increase 
in the market driving the price down but, perhaps, 
more  importantly,  raising  the  compensatory 
5  The  US  increased  by  100%  the  import  tariff  on 
European  textiles,  cheese,  jam  and  cookies.  The 
sanctions affected all Communitarian countries but 
Netherlands  and  Denmark.  The  US  government 
claimed this tax would compensate for the estimated 
$520 million losses US firms have had as a result of 
the EU import banana policy (La Nación 1999).AGRONOMÍA COSTARRICENSE 122
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payments to European producers (Commission of 
the European Communities 2000).
Not  surprisingly,  each  party  claimed 
some kind of modification to the proposal that 
would  fit  their  interests.  Some  of  them  even 
advocated  for  a  different  system.  For  example, 
most exporters favored an import regime based 
on  historical  references.  Their  main  argument 
was  that  the  proposed  system  would  reinforce 
the large operators’ position to the detriment of 
the small and medium sized ones. They claimed 
that  the  larger  exporters  were  more  capable  of 
negotiating shipping arrangements (Commission 
of the European Communities 2000).
European  community  producers  were 
indifferent to the system since the compensatory 
payments  would  have  covered  any  decrease  in 
their  income.  On  the  contrary,  ACP  producers 
favored the maintenance of the quota system as 
long as possible. However, even though the new 
system  did  not  perfectly  fit  their  interests,  the 
foreseen increase in the tariff preference in one 
of the quotas was to their benefit (Commission of 
the European Communities 2000).
The system never came into effect however, 
primarily because of US opposition. At this point 
the EU started the bilateral negotiations with the 
US that brought the EU-US agreement in 2001 
discussed in the next section. But, before moving 
on to this, it is important to mention the CMOB’s 
estimated economic impacts.
The 1993 policy resulted in higher priced 
bananas for most EU consumers. Many studies 
have  been  conducted  since  the  introduction  of 
this  policy  to  quantify  its  effects  on  European 
countries’ welfare.6 All of them agree that German 
consumers were the most affected by the CMOB 
due to a lower supply of bananas in this market 
and  its  consequent  increase  in  prices.  Recall, 
Germany initially had no restrictions on imports. 
After  the  1993  regime,  exports  to  Germany 
were estimated to decrease by 250 000 t year-1 
compared  to  a  free  market  situation.  German 
consumers’ welfare losses were calculated at $50 
million year-1 (Kersten 1995). On the other hand, 
consumers in countries that had restrictive import 
policies,  such  as  France  and  UK,  were  made 
better off. In those countries, real import prices 
of  bananas  decreased  with  the  introduction  of 
the new regime. A similar situation occurred in 
Spain, Portugal, and Greece (Kox 1998). 
However, despite the gains for some countries, 
total consumer welfare decreased in the European 
market. Consumers’ losses for the EU (excluding 
Germany) were calculated at approximately $640 
million  compared  to  the  market  situation  that 
prevailed before 1993 (Kersten 1995, Borrell 1997). 
This estimation corresponds solely to consumers’ 
losses due to the CMOB. As mentioned in Section 
1, Borrell estimated that policies prevalent prior to 
1993, cost consumers $1.6 billion a year.
Additionally,  the  goal  of  protecting 
developing countries was inefficiently, and only 
partially,  reached.  The  1993  regime  imposed 
costly  resource  transfers  from  one  group  of 
underdeveloped nations to another. It is estimated 
that Latin American nations incurred a cost of 
$0.32  ($98  million  a  year)  for  every  dollar  of 
aid reaching preferred suppliers (Kersten 1995, 
Borrell 1997).
EU PERSPECTIVE ON THE CMOB 
AND THE BANANA WAR
In addition to the point of view of the third 
parties affected by the EU banana import policy, it 
is important to consider the European perception 
6  Welfare  is  an  economic  measure  of  well-being  that 
takes into account theory-based measures of the dif-
ference between what consumers would pay and what 
producers would accept for the product and the actual 
price  in  the  market.  The  calculations  thus  take  into 
account consumers, producers as well as the govern-
ment sector and researchers strive to measure the differ-
ence between the welfare that exists under a particular 
regime and that which might exist if, say, the quotas and 
tariffs were abolished. Interested readers are referred to 
Alston, Norton and Pardey for a discussion of different 
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and justification of its own banana regime. One 
of  the  main  justifications  given  by  the  EU  is 
the need to fulfill the requirements established 
by  the  European  Single  Market  (ESM).  This 
policy  intended  to  increase  welfare  within  the 
EU  through  a  higher  level  of  competition  and 
efficiency.  Therefore,  defenders  of  the  CMOB 
argue that this policy had a justifiable goal: to 
benefit  domestic  producers  and  consumers  of 
bananas  within  the  EU’s  borders.  Defenders 
argue  that  there  is  sufficient  proof  that  the 
European Single Market was indeed successful at 
enhancing global welfare when considering the 
policy as a whole (Allen et al. 1998). Therefore, 
one could argue that the CMOB is an exception to 
the success the more global policy had.
As a second goal, the policy was meant to 
protect the economies of the ACP nations. These 
countries are alleged to be highly dependent on 
the  banana  sector  and  any  sudden  adjustment 
in  their  productive  structure  would  have  had 
devastating social consequences.7 The nobility of 
this argument breaks down however, when one 
considers  developing  nations  outside  the  ACP. 
As discussed earlier, the 1993 regime imposed 
extremely high costs for Latin American countries, 
also developing nations, thus the transfer of surplus 
is arguably from one developing region to another. 
Based on their Human Development index many 
ACP  nations  are  considered  among,  so  called, 
medium developed nations (Cameroon and Cote 
d’Ivoir are the exceptions). By comparison, most 
of the Latin American countries are doing very 
poorly based on the same index (Table 7).
Evaluating  dependency  on  the  sector,  a 
study  performed  by  Kox  in  1998  found  that 
banana  exports  to  the  EU  represent  only  3-
7%  of  total  export  earnings  for  the  poorest 
ACP  countries.  Meanwhile,  banana  exports’ 
contribution  to  domestic  income  in  Honduras, 
Costa  Rica,  Ecuador  and  Panama  is  3-8  times 
more than in most ACP countries.
In addition to the economic justification of 
the CMOB, there are also political reasons that 
made the EU‘s adopted systems preferable to a free-
trade alternative. One of the stronger arguments 
is that under free trade, the EU would have felt 
political pressure to make direct payments to the 
communitarian and ACP producers of their former 
colonies. This would have been a hefty expense. 
Even if the EU had had the budget, Tangermann 
(1997) argues that none of the benefited parties felt 
comfortable with the idea of resources provided 
in  such  a  fashion.  Additionally,  both  the  EU 
and  the  ACP  nations  worried  about  the  social 
consequences that adjustment to their productive 
structure would have.
Perhaps the biggest argument used by the 
CMOB  defenders  is  that  this  policy  was  not  as 
costly as has been estimated. Most studies make 
their  welfare  estimations  based  on  the  situation 
prevalent  in  1991  and  1992  (Borrell).  However, 
this period is arguably unrepresentative of the real 
tendency in the market because the Latin American 
exporters  increased  their  shipments  forecasting 
a  change  in  the  policy  (Tangermann  1997). 
Nevertheless,  defenders  of  this  argument  left  an 
important question unanswered: how were the Latin 
American exporters able to increase their shipments 
if most of the European market was protected under 
the multi-policy situation prior to 1993? 
AgREEMENT BETWEEN THE US 
AND THE EU
After 8 years of controversy (1993-2000), 
the EU negotiated with the US a settlement that 
would put an end to the CMOB. It also involved, 
in addition to the US, most traditional nations 
implicated  in  the  banana  dispute.  Both  the 
United States and the European Union agreed 
to modify their commercial policy related to the 
banana dispute. 
The agreement was conceived in 2 stages. 
The  first  phase  came  into  effect  in  July  2001. 
7  For example, 70% of Saint Vincent’s revenue depends 
directly and indirectly on the banana sector. One of 
every 3 people in Saint Lucia depends on this activity. 
Additionally, 60% of the revenue received by the 4 EU 
overseas territories comes from banana production.AGRONOMÍA COSTARRICENSE 124
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It  established  a  temporary  elimination  of  the 
100%  ad  valorem  tariff  the  US  had  imposed 
on  imports  of  certain  European  goods.  This 
tariff  was  applied  by  the  US  as  a  sanction  on 
the  EU  for  the  banana  dispute  held  with  the 
Latin American countries. Additionally, the US 
agreed to drop its hold to the Lomé Convention, 
allowing the waiver to Article I of the GATT to 
pass  (This  waiver  allowed  the  EU  to  continue 
giving preferential treatment to ACP countries). 
The European Union agreed to allocate 2 more 
100 000 t quotas for Latin American bananas and 
to eliminate a third quota for the ACP countries. 
The distribution of quotas was based on historical 
Table 7.   Human Development Index (HDI) of the EU banana suppliers (a).
Country Region Human development index Rank (1999) GDP per capita ($US) 1
Dominica* ACP 0.873 - 3778
Grenada * ACP 0.843 - 3295
Saint Lucia * ACP 0.838 - 4505
Saint Vincent and the 
Granadillas (a) 
ACP 0.836 - 3018
Costa Rica LA 0.821 41 2942
Mexico LA  0.790 51 5036
Panama LA  0.784 52 3397
Belize ACP  0.776 54 3045
Colombia LA  0.765 62 2093
Suriname ACP  0.758 64 1657
Brazil LA  0.750 69 3525
Philippines Others  0.749 70 1032
Jamaica ACP  0.738 78 1487
Ecuador LA 0.726 84 1109
Cape Verde ACP 0.708 91 1400
El Salvador LA 0.701 95 2007
Nicaragua LA 0.635 106 459
Honduras LA 0.634 107 856
Guatemala LA 0.626 108 1637
Madagascar ACP 0.462 135 239
Ivory Coast ACP 0.426 144 808
Source: Human Development Reports. 1999
(a) The HDI combines the real purchasing power per capita, life expectancy at birth, education in terms of adult literacy and 
school enrollment.
* The index was not reported for these countries in 1999. The value shown corresponds to 1994.
(1) Source:  Statistics Division of the United Nations Secretiarat and International Labour Office.CHACóN-CASCANTE AND CRESPI: The European Union banana import policy 125
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allocations  of  import  licenses  using  the  years 
1994-1996 as the reference period (this reference 
period was selected by the EU based on trade 
data availability).
The second stage would move toward the 
elimination of the CMOB and the adoption of a 
new import system. A difference of this phase 
with respect to the first stage of the agreement 
was that it did not have a definitive schedule for 
its implementation although it had to enter into 
force  not  later  than  January  2006  (Guyomard 
and Le Mouël 2002). However, it was established 
that for the elimination of US sanctions imposed 
on the EU to be definitive, this phase had to be 
fully implemented. The EU started a consultation 
process in July 2002 aiming to define the new 
regime, but it was not until January 2006 that a 
new import policy was implemented.
The disputed regime was substituted by a 
tariff-only import system under which protected 
and  non-preferred  exporters  compete  solely  on 
the basis of tariff differences. Quotas on Latin 
American bananas were eliminated and imports 
from this region are taxed at €176 t-1 (Recall, 
the previous regime had a tariff of €75 t-1 with 
a quota). ACP imports are allowed duty free up 
to a quota level of 775 000 t, but ACP imports 
exceeding this amount must pay the same €176 t-1 
as the dollar bananas. 
Defining a tariff level was a long process 
for the EU and it involved 2 disputes brought to 
the WTO by Latin American nations. The initial 
requirement imposed by the WTO on the EU was 
that the tariff level had to ensure Latin American 
suppliers  at  least  the  same  market  access  they 
had enjoyed under the previous import regime. In 
January 2005, the EU announced that after several 
months of consultation with ACP countries, they 
had defined a tariff level of €230 t-1 to imports 
from non-preferred suppliers. The ACP acquiesced 
to this tax believing it would let them compete 
against  Latin  American  bananas.  Considering 
this tariff level prohibitively high, a group of Latin 
American exporters requested arbitration with the 
WTO under the Doha Ministerial Decision. The 
arbitration panel determined the proposed tariff 
did not grant Latin American suppliers the same 
market-access they had previously enjoyed. 
Afterwards, the EU proposed a lower tariff 
of €187 t-1, which still did not please non-preferred 
suppliers. On this occasion, the EU requested a 
second arbitration to determine whether this new 
tax  level  was  satisfactory.  However,  the  report 
made by the WTO ruled out this tariff level on the 
grounds that it still did not provide Latin American 
access to the EU banana market. Finally, the EU 
set a tariff of €176 t-1 to imports from this region 
and that is the level that exists today. 
EqUIVALENCE OF THE TARIFF-ONLY 
AND THE PRE-2006 IMPORT REgIMES
Since the WTO required the EU to set its 
new tariff at a level that would maintain market 
access to its market, several authors have analyzed 
the feasibility of this task by trying to calculate a 
tariff equivalent to the tariff-quota system of the 
old  regime.  Others  have  analyzed  the  possible 
effects  that  alternative  tariff  levels  would  have 
on  the  main  producers.  Due  to  differences  in 
modeling  approaches,  market  parameters  used 
and  in  the  interpretation  of  what  “maintaining 
market access” means, quite diverse results have 
emerged among the different studies. However, 
there is a common factor among most of these 
studies.  This  is  that  maintaining  the  pre-2006 
market  structure  is  almost  impossible  by  just 
using a tariff restriction. 
Guyomard  and  Le  Mouël  (2002)  for 
example, calculated that a tariff of about €182 
t-1  would  maintain  2005  market  structure.  But 
the author warns readers that this result is highly 
sensitive to model parameterization and modeling 
assumptions. Furthermore, this tariff level would 
only maintain market share in 2006. The level 
of this import tax must increase in subsequent 
years for ACP countries to maintain their 2005 
market share given productivity changes in Latin 
American banana production. 
Arias et al. (2006) used a partial equilibrium 
model to test various market scenarios and their AGRONOMÍA COSTARRICENSE 126
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corresponding  tariff  equivalence.  The  authors 
concluded that the EU had to use several policy 
instruments if its objective was to simultaneously 
achieve all policy objectives attained with the 
CMOB  import  policy.  That  is,  a  single  tariff 
level  is  not  enough  to  maintain  the  pre-2006 
market structure. 
Arce et al. (2004) also tried to determine 
the minimum tariff level that would sustain the 
pre-2006  market  equilibrium.  Their  estimations 
indicate that the EU must impose a tariff level of 
€259.8 t-1 for equilibrium prices and trade flows 
to  stay  as  in  2004.  The  authors  estimated  that 
setting the tariff level at €75, as requested by Latin 
America, would increase imports from this area by 
7% and reduce its corresponding prices by 8.5% 
Finally,  Anania  (2006)  estimated  that 
the current tariff level of €176 t-1, benefits non-
preferred  suppliers.  Results  show  that  exports 
of  these  countries  will  increase  by  400  000  t 
in  2007  and  further  in  subsequent  years.  The 
author estimated that the tariff level proposed 
by the EU in the second arbitration would have 
maintained at least the same market access to 
non-preferred exporters. 
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article was to provide 
a  brief  but  detailed  history  of  the  so-called 
“banana war”. The article summarizes the main 
events that have characterized the conflict among 
the European Union, Latin American countries, 
African, Caribbean and Pacific nations and the 
United States regarding banana imports into the 
European  Union.    Disseminating  the  work  of 
various sources, our goals were to provide in a 
single article i) the relevant details and histories 
of  the  myriad  trade  disputes;  ii)  a  succinct 
discussion of the diverse and complicated tariff 
and  quota  regimes  for  banana  imports  that 
have  existed  in  the  last  decade  and  how  the 
came  about,  and  iii)  explain  how  the  banana 
export market has been shaped by these forces. 
Hopefully we have provided the interested reader 
with a concise synopsis of how the newest import 
system adopted by the EU in January of 2006 
came  about  and  what  the  current  research  has 
to say with regard to the economic cost of the 
previous  import  regimes  and,  finally,  whether 
this new system is an improvement or not. 
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